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California Wrongful Death Statute: Correcting an
"Unintended Mistake"
Kimberly Jean Wedding

Code Sections Affected
Code of Civil Procedure § 377.060(d), § 377.060(e) (new).
SB 449 (Sher); 1997 STAT. Ch. 13
(Effective May 23, 1997)

I. INTRODUCIION
On December 14, 1994, a Learjet crashed in Fresno, California, resulting in the

death of pilots Brad Sexton and Richard E. Anderson.! Sexton left behind a wife,
mother, father, two brothers, and one sister.2 The following year, Sexton's parents,

Jacque and Isabel, sued Learjet for the wrongful death of their son, arguing that
Learjet's negligence caused an on-board fire, resulting in the crash. However, the

Sextons' suit was dismissed after Learjet argued that the Sextons had no standing
to sue according to California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.! This section
did not allow parents to sue for the wrongful death of their married child if the

parents' cause of action arose between 1993 and 1997.
In the midst of their appeal, the Sextons contacted Senator Byron Sher

requesting urgency legislation to rectify this problem. 6 Consequently, Chapter 13
was enacted to restore the ability of parents, like the Sextons, to sue for the wrong-

1.
See FeliciaCousart,Pilot's FamilyCoping With Loss, FRESNOBEE, Dec. 28,1994, at Al (reporting the
crash of a Learjet in Fresno, California).
2.
See Russell Clemings, The Learjet Tragedy: A Father's Quest, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 8, 1996, at Al
(identifying the family members that Brad Sexton left behind following his death on December 14, 1994).
3.
Cyndee Fontana & Tom Kertscher, Two More Suits Filed in Learjet Crash;Pilot'sFamily, Apartment
Residents and Employees Seek Damages,FRESNO BEE, Dec. 13, 1995, at B3 (stating that the Sextons had filed suit
for unspecified damages in Los Angeles Superior Court on December 8, 1995).
4.
See Clemings, supra note 2, at Al (describing that the Sexton's suit against Leaijet had been "thrown
out of court in August because of a technical problem over their standing, oreligibility to sue"); see alsoLetterfrom
Jacque Sexton to Senator Byron Sher (Jan. 21, 1997) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
Letter from Jacque Sexton] (explaining that Learjet had persuaded the court to find that the Sextons had no standing
to sue them for the wrongful death of their son).
5.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (amended by Chapter 13) (allowing parents to sue for the wrongful
death of their child, who had left no surviving issue at the time of death, if the cause of action arose after January
1997); see also Clemings, supra note 2, at Al (reporting that the Sextons' suit was dismissed because California
law did not permit parents to sue for the wrongful death of their married child).
6.
See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 2d 412, 418, 84 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1938) (defining an
"urgency statute" as one which is "necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety"); see
also Letter from Jacque Sexton, supra note 4, at 1 (requesting Senator Sher's assistance in getting urgency
legislation passed to correct the four year time period in which parents, such as himself, had no standing to sue).
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ful death of their married child when the decedent has no surviving issue.7 Most

importantly, it enables parents to sue when the cause of action arose between
January 1, 1993 and January 1, 1997.8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Priorto Chapter 13
In 1992, Chapter 178 repealed section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which allowed parents to sue for the wrongful death of their child. 9 Specifically,

Chapter 178 prohibited parents from suing for the wrongful death of their child,
except when that child had left behind no surviving spouse, child, or issue.'t
Realizing that Chapter 178 denied many parents the right to sue, the Legislature
passed Chapter 563.11 That legislation specifically restored the ability of parents to
sue for the wrongful death of a child who had left a surviving spouse but no surviving issue.'2 However, Chapter 563 applied prospectively to causes of action
which arose after January 1, 1997.13 Thus, parents whose cause of4 action arose between the passage of Chapters 178 and 563 lost standing to sue.'
B. Chapter13

Chapter 13 corrects this "unintended gap" in existing law by declaring that
California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 applies to any cause of action

7.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.060 (amended by Chapter 13); see SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF SB 449,
at 1 (Apr. 7, 1997) (stating that SB 449 intends to restore "the ability of parents to seek damages for the wrongful
death of a son or daughter for any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993, to the same extent that the
right existed prior to this date").
8.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.060(d) (enacted by Chapter 14); see Letter from Senator Byron Sher to
Governor Pete wilson (May 21, 1997) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Senator]
(explairing that SB 449 would correct the four-year gap in which certain parents were denied to ability to sue those
responsible for the wrongful death of their adult children).
9.
1992 Cal. Stat. Ch. 178, sec. 19, at 725 (West) (repealing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377).
10. 1992 Cal. Stat. Ch. 178, sec. 20, at 725 (West) (enacting CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.60); see SENATE
FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF SB 449, at 2 (Apr. 7, 1997) (stating that Chapter 178 limited a parent's ability to sue for
wrongful death).
11. 1996 Stat. Ch. 563, see. I, at 2603 (amending CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60); see SENATEJUDICIARY
CoMITEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 449. at 2 (Apr. 1, 1997) (noting that the pas, age of Chapter 563 was
intended to restore the ability of certain parents to sue for wrongful death).
12. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(a) (Vest Supp. 1997) (allowing persons entitled to property of the
decedent by intestate succession to sue for the wrongful death of the decedent when the decedent leaves no
surviving issue).
13. See SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSiS OFSB 449. at 2 (Apr. 7, 1997) (stating that Chapter 563 only applied to
causes of action arising after January 1, 1997).
14. See id. (explaining that the proponent contends that passage of Chapters 178 and 563 has "unfairly
deprived him and otherparents like him of the ability to file a wrongful death cause of action for the death of a son
or daughter").
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arising on or after January 1, 1993.15 Moreover, Chapter 13 declares that Chapters
178 and 573 were not intended to adversely affect the ability of a person to sue who
had a cause of action under prior law.16 The effect of Chapter 13 is to close this
"unintended gap" and allow parents,
like the Sextons, to sue those responsible for
17
the wrongful death of their child.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF CHAPTER

13

A. Retroactivity and Nunc Pro Tunc Declarations
Chapter 13 contained a legislative declaration stating that it was not the intent
of the legislature to adversely affect the standing of those with causes of action prior
to the passage of Chapters 178 and 563.18 This statement raised questions in the

Senate Judiciary Committee regarding its possible interpretation as applying
retroactively. 19

According to the California Court of Appeals, an amended statute is not given
retroactive effect unless the Legislature has clearly stated its intent that the amendment apply retroactively. 0 Moreover, in Holt v. RE. Morgan,2 the Court of
Appeals held that a statute "must give the previous transaction to which it relates
some different legal effect from that which it had under the law when it occurred"

for it to apply retroactively.22 Consequently, some courts have found that an effort
to clarify existing law does not raise questions of retroactivity23 The Legislature

15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(d) (enacted by Chapter 13); see Letter from Senator, supra note 8, at
1 (stating that SB 449 "is needed to restore the rights of certain parents to seek damages for the wrongful death of
their adult children").
16. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.60(e) (enacted by Chapter 13).
17. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OF SB 449, at 1 (Apr. 1, 1997) (describing
the effect of Chapter 13 on the rights of parents to sue for the wrongful death of their child).
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(e) (enacted by Chapter 13).
19. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMn-rEE ANALYSIS OF SB 449, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997) (raising the
question of whether Chapter 13 applies retroactively).
20. See G.T.E. Sprint Communication Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, I Cal. App. 4th 827, 833,2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 441, 444 (1991) (discussing the presumption that an amendment to a statute acts prospectively, not
retroactively).
21. 128Cal.App.2d 113,274P.2d915 (1954).
22. Id. at 117,274 P.2d at 917.
23. See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist., 186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 722, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823, 832
(1986) (explaining that an amendment which created a right to safe schools clarified existing law and did not raise
the question of retroactivity since "it merely restates the law as it was all the time"); Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.
App. 3d 202, 211, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1985) (holding that if the purpose of an amendment is to clarify
preexisting law, it is simply stating "the law as it was all the time, and no question of retroactive application is
involved").
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refers to these types of amendments as those which are declarations of "nunc pro
tunc." 24
Chapter 13 specifically states that legislature did not intend Chapter 178 to
adversely affect the standing of any person under prior lawY Interestingly, Chapter
13's legislative declaration is similar to other declarations which merely clarified
existing law and were not found to apply retroactively. 26 If also found to be merely
explaining the existing law, Chapter 13 would not be considered as applying retroactively, but as a "nunc pro tune" declaration.27
B. Practicabilityof Chapter13
Chapter 13 is practicable because it seeks to repair the unintended consequence
of prior legislation which, as argued by Jacque Sexton, "has unfairly deprived him
28
and other parents like him of the ability to file a wrongful death cause of action."
By introducing Chapter 13 as an urgency statute, it allows the Sextons to continue
their wrongful death suit.29
However, Chapter 13 does not include any provisions which would allow
parents, who previously had no standing under section 377.60 because their cause
of action arose between 1993 and 1997, to commence litigation. Although Chapter
13 will grant standing in these cases, the one year statute of limitations for the commencement of a wrongful death will effectively bar any such litigation.30

24. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMfEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 449, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997) (observing
that "nunc pro tune" declarations have been recognized by the courts); see also BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1069
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "nunc pro tune" as Latin for "now for then" and "a thing done now, which shall have the
same legal effect and force as if done at the time it ought to have been done").
25. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(e) (enacted by Chapter 13).

26.

See Re-Open Rambla, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1510,46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822,

828 (1995) (finding that the Legislature's clear statement of intent in amending California Government Code §
57329 and § 57385 and California Streets and Highways Code § 989 in 1991 convinced the court that the statute
was not meant to operate retroactively but merely to clarify existing law); see also G.TE. SprintCommunications
Corp., I Cal. App. 4th at 836,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446 (holding that the legislative intent behind the amendments of
statutes concerning the collection of surcharges for intrastate telephone communications services was meant to
clarify the meaning of those sections and not to operate retroactively).
27. See SENATE JuDIcIARY Commrrr COXmn,
m
EEANALYSIS OF SB 449, at 4 (Apr. 1, 1997) (stating that,
after giving deference to the legislative declaration contained in Chapter 13, the amendments would not apply
retroactively).
28. Id.
29. See SENATEJuDIcARYCOMMrTrEECOMMrrTEANALYSiSOFSB449,at4 (Apr. 1, 1997) (noting that
"if enacted while the appeals are still pending, SB 449 could be applied by the courts").
30. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (Vest 1982) (requiring the commencement of wrongful death actions
within one year of the date of death).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Chapters 178 and 573 have adversely affected Jacque and Isabel Sexton and
others similarly situated in their endeavor to collect damages from those responsible
for the wrongful death of their children." The egregious failure of the Legislature
to correct this "unintended consequence" over the years is disturbing, 32 especially

in light of the heightened emotional aspect of wrongful death claims. In addition,
the legislature took over three months to pass this law despite its status as urgency
legislation.3 3 Perhaps the California Legislature should follow the lead of the United
States Congress, an example of a legislative body which seeks to set specific time

periods aside for corrections to legislation and administrative regulations.3

Coined "Corrections Day,"35 the United States Congress has set up a bi-monthly

review procedure for bills presented by Congressional members for reasons including poor drafting and unintended consequences of previous legislation. 6 The
procedure allows the House to revise and correct those bills considered to be
uncontroversial and which require minimal debate. 7 The bills submitted under
"Corrections Day" procedures would still need to be referred to and approved by

the appropriate House committees, receive approval by three-fifths majority of the
House, as well as procure both Senate and Presidential approval before being

implemented.

8

House leaders claim that this new procedure is a better alternative to suspension
rules, which are currently in place to expedite uncontroversial legislation. 9 Since

31. See Letter from Jacque Sexton, supra note 4. at 1 (describing that the passage of Chapters 178 and 563
have excluded the Sextons and other parents from suing for wrongful death).
32. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrTEF, COMMrrTEE HEARING ON SB 449, at 1 (Apr. 1, 1997) (stating that
an attempt had been made to correct the unintended consequence of Chapter 178 through the passage of Chapter
563 in 1996, but noting that Chapter 563 only acted prospectively due to an oversight); Letter from Senator, supra
note 8, at I (explaining that Chapter 13 was "necessary to eliminate the four-year gap in law unintentionally
created").
33. See COMPLETE BILL HISTORY OF SB 449, May 23, 1997 at 1 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (providing data which shows that the bill was introduced on February 19, 1997 and was signed into law
on May 23, 1997).
34. See Fix-it Day OK'd in House, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 21, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Fix-it Day]
(reporting that the House of Representatives had agreed to a procedure which would allow "quick votes on
repealing laws and regulations that 60% of lawmakers consider stupid or unnecessary").
35. See H.R. Res. 168, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing a new House of Representatives procedure entitled
"Corrections Day," approved by a 271-146 vote).
36. See id. (explaining the new "Corrections Day" procedure passed by the House).
37. See House's Weekly Fix-it Try, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 2, 1995, at A12 (reporting the rules outlined
by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich regarding the passage of bills during Corrections Day).
38. See Kevin Merida, 'CorrectionsDay' To Hit Twice Monthly; Some House DemocratsSee Red As GOP
Sets Tuesdays To Cut Unnecessary Tape, WASH. POST, June 21, 1995, at A19 (explaining the procedure that bills
submitted under the Corrections Day calendar must entail before they will go into effect).
39. Id. at A19 (stating that the House of Representative has in place already a procedure, known as
suspension of rules, that would expedite passage of uncontroversial legislation and normally requires a two-thirds
majority to pass).

457

1998 / Civil Procedure
its creation, the federal "Corrections Day" has addressed and resolved many
issues,40 including environmental regulations, 4 1 IRS decisions, 42 and public

housing.' In fact, representatives have asked their constituents to submit their
suggestions for bills which they feel need to be revised or repealed. 44 Interestingly,
the Illinois State Legislature has also implemented a similar corrections procedure,
known as "Common Sense Day. 45 The goal of the Illinois "Common Sense Day"
46
is to "eradicate obsolete or duplicative laws on the state's books."
Perhaps the California State Legislature could create a "California Corrections
Day," held in both houses once per month and include a provision for expedited
governor approval. Chapter 13, which passed the Senate by a 37-0 vote and the
Assembly by a 78-0 vote,47 would have been a good candidate for use in a California version of "Corrections Day," because it was an uncontroversial measure. If
Chapter 13 had been approved under a "Corrections Day" procedure, it would likely
have been enacted in a shorter period of time than under the urgency provisions. It
is conceivable that had the law been revised at an earlier time, the trial courts would
have been able to consider Chapter 13's impact on the Sextons' suit rather than at
the later, and more expensive, appellate level.

40. See Associated Press, Hunting ForSilly Statutes and Loony Laws, SAN ANTONIO EXPRE s-NEWS, July
20, 1997, at A19 [hereinafter Silly Statutes] (reporting that "Corrections Day" procedures have repealed 16 laws
since its creation).
41. See Fix-it Day, supranote 34 at A14 (reporting that one of the first issues to be resolved under the new
corrections day procedure in the House is revising the impact of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rules,
specifically in regards to their impact on San Diego and the dumping of raw sewage into the Pacific Ocean).
42. See Associated Press, Gilchrest Bill Aims To Protect Jobs of Rural School Bts Drivers; IRS Policy
Threatens TheirEmployment, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 27,1997, at B6 (explaining that U.S. Rep. Wayne T. Gilchrest
had placed on the "Corrections Day" calendar a bill that would ensure protection to rural bus drivers from an IRS
decision which endanger their jobs).
43. See House Unanimous:Evict Addicts, NEW ORLEANS TMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 26, 1995, at A20 (stating
that the House unanimously passed a bill under the "Corrections Day" procedures which would allow public
housing officials to evict or deny housing to those people who use illegal drugs).
44. See Frank Devlin, GreenwoodLooksFor 'Dumbest' Laws, ALLE TOwN MORNING CALL, Oct.31, 1995,
at B3 (reporting that U.S. Representative James Greenwood had asked his constituents to notify him of laws which
could be zddressed during a "Corrections Day" hearing); see also Silly Statutes, supranote 40 at A19 (discussing
a meeting called by two Texas Congressional members, where they plan to hear constituent complaints regarding
their problems with U.S. laws).
45. See Michael Gillis, Republican Legislators Looking To Strike Obsolete State Laws, CHICAGO SUNTIMEs, Sept. 20, 1995, at A19 (reporting that the Illinois Speaker of the House had announccd a plan to hold a
"Common Sense Day" each month modeled after the federal "Corrections Day").
46. Id.
47. Letter from Senator, supra note 8, at 2 (May 21, 1997) (stating that Chapter 13 passed both houses
unanimously).
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Clearing Up Civil Procedure Section 425.16-Delivering The

Final Knockout Punch to SLAPP Suits
DoraA. Corby

Code Sections Affected
Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (amended).
SB 1296 (Lockyer); 1997 STAT. Ch. 271

I. INTRODUCTION

Mary is worried that the developer planning to build a new subdivision in her
neighborhood will destroy a nearby wetland. So, Mary and her neighbors start a
petition opposing the new development. The developer hears Mary is planning to
present the petition against his development at the next city council meeting. The
day after the meeting, a process server shows up at Mary's door handing her papers.
The papers say the developer is suing Mary for defamation and for more money
than she is worth even though all Mary did was voice her and her neighbors'
opinions at a government meeting.
Today groups and individuals are being sued simply because they chose to
exercise their right to express their views on public issues t These suits stem from
ordinary communications such as writing a letter to the editor, testifying at a public
hearing, lobbying, or circulating a petition.2 When groups or individuals are sued
for speaking out on public issues, it is the corporation,
government official, or
3
people against whom they speak out who sue them.
SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, a
term coined by Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan in their study of
lawsuits filed against people who speak out on issues of public interest.4 Professors
Pring and Canan established four criteria to determine if a suit should be
characterized as a SLAPP suit. There must be: (1) Communication influencing a

1. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 1 (1996).
2.
Id.
3.
Ed Golder, Horton, ACLU in RareAlliance Though Usually IdeologicalOpposites,They're Both Trying
to Stop Lawsuits Intendedto Keep Citizensfrom Petitioningthe Government, GRAND RAPIDS PREss (Grand Rapids,
Mich.), May 5, 1997, at BI; see id. (noting that about 66% of the SLAPP suits filed are filed by private companies

and about 33% are filed by government officials).
4. See PRNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 3 (observing that there was no real recognition of suits against
those speaking out); id. (stating that the Professors created the phrase "strategic lawsuits against public
participation" to bring attention to these types of suits).
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government action that (2) results in a civil suit being filed (3) against the person
or organization speaking out (4) about an issue of public interest.5 Moreover,
SLAPP suits often involve disputes over communications protected under the
petition clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 3, of the California Constitution.6

However, most SLAPP suits are meritless because the filer7 often initiates the
action not to redress any real legal wrong, but for the sole purpose of either
intimidating the target or using the target as an example to discourage others from
speaking out.s The filer usually does not hope to win9 the case, but rather intends

to tie up the target's funds and energy until the filer's measure or agenda is passed
or accepted. 0
II. BACKGROUND BEHIND THE CURRENT VERSION OF
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16

A. Getting Anti-SLAPP LegislationAdopted in California
The current version of the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 incited quite

a battle between the Legislature and the Governor in initial attempts to get the antiSLAPP legislation enacted in California." Senator Lockyer tried twice prior to 1992

to enact anti-SLAPP legislation' 2 in California. 3 The first time in 1990, the anti-

5.
PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 8-9; see id. (emphasizing that the test is objective and does not
consider the filer's motive for filing the suit). But see CAL.. C[V. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 1997) (stating
that California's anti-SLAPP statute covers any written or oral statement made before or in connection with a
"legislative, executive or judicial proceeding or any other official proceeding authorized by law" or covers any
written or oral statement "made in a place open to the public or public forum with an issue of public interest").
6.
See PRtNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that there had been no studies done focusing on the
relation of the petition clause and civil lawsuits up until the time of their study). But see CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §
425.16 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that the section also includes freedom of speech).
7.
See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 9 (clarifying that it is more appropriate to use the terms "filer"
and "target" to distinguish the parties instead of the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" because not all SLAPP suit,arise in the context of an original complaint but can arise by cross-complaints also).
8.
See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutionsto the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 395, 397-99 (1993) (noting that SLAPP suits are filed to intimidate, silence and discourage people from
opposing the filer in his or her plan).
9.
See Golder, supranote 3 (noting that almost 90% of SLAPP suits are dismissed); John J. Brcher, The
Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 105 (1988) (noting that
in most SLAPP suits filed, the judgment is not for the plaintiff).
10. See Barker, supranote 8, at 397 (pointing out that sometimes the suit is filed just to tie up the target'resources so that he or she is too busy defending to oppose the filer publicly).
11. See PRING&CANAN, supranote 1, at 196 (noting that it took three tries to get anti-SLAPP legislation
passed in California).
12. See Jeffrey R. Sipe, SLAPP-Happy Discourse, INsIGHT MAG., June 27, 1996, at 37 (explaining that
legislation providing for a quick hearing on a motion to dismiss is considered anti-SLAPP legislation).
13. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196 (noting that in 1990 and in 1991 there was proposed antiSLAPP legislation in California that had been vetoed by the Governor); see generally Lockyer, SB 2313 (1990)
(promulgating anti-SLAPP legislation).
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SLAPP bill passed both houses but was vetoed by then Governor George
Deukmejian.14 Opposition to that bill arose because the overall language was too
broad.' 5 However, Governor Deukmejian rejected the bill claiming there were
already enough protections and sanctions in place to deter these particular kind of

frivolous lawsuits.' 6
With a new governor in office,' 7 Senator Lockyer decided to try his luck

again.18 The 1991 bill again overwhelmingly passed both houses but this time most
opposition to the bill surrounded the "substantial probability" language used in the
proposed statute.' 9 The language was thought to place too much of a burden on the

filer (plaintiff) to prove his case too early.20 Finally, in 1992, Senator Lockyer, after
reworking his bill to incorporate changes suggested by the governor,2' saw his years
of hard work pay off. Governor Pete Wilson signed California's anti-SLAPP
legislation into law, creating Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.22

14. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196 (explaining the history of anti-SLAPP legislation in
California).
15. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809. 820, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446,452 (1994) (observing
that the first attempt at anti-SLAPP legislation was vetoed because it would have implemented a pleading bar unless
the filer could justify the suit); PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196 (explaining that the first bill relating to antiSLAPP legislation required that there automatically be an advanced court ruling to determine if the filer would have
a "substantial probability" to win or the filer would be prohibited from filing a suit affecting a person's First
Amendment rights of speech or petition); id. (noting that the main opposition to the legislation came from the
California Building Industry Association).
16. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196.
17. The new governor was Pete Wilson.
18. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196 (noting that to get the anti-SLAPP bill passed, Senator
Lockyer tacked the bill onto another more popular bill (SB 341 of 1991) that limited liability for officers and
directors of nonprofit organizations and changed the pre-filing ruling to a motion to strike).
19. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 196 (explaining that "substantial probability" is the standard by
which the SLAPP suit filer has to show that he will win his suit. thus making sure the suit is not frivolous); Barker,
supra note 8, at 411-12 (noting that the California Building Industry Association saw the "substantial probability"
language as too high of a burden to meet before conducting discovery); Mark Goldowitz, SLAPP Lawsuits and the
FirstAmendment, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 23. 1991, at B13 (commenting that Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the
proposed legislation because he too felt that the "substantial probability" language was too high of a burden to
meet).
20. See supra note 19 and accompany text (discussing the rejection of the "substantial probability"
language); infra note 21 (discussing the same).
21. See Getting SLAPPed: An Answer to Malicious Lawsuits Against Activists, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRM.,
Sept. 3, 1992, at B 12 (noting that one of the changes made to the bill was that the word "substantial" was deleted);
Puttingan End to Intimidation:GovernorShould Sign Bill that Would Curb UnfairLawsuitsAgainst Homeowners,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at B6 (stating that Governor Wilson vetoed the anti-SLAPP legislation because the
language did not ensure that legitimate suits could be filed). Cf. Lafayette Morehouse v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37
Cal. App. 4th 855, 866,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 53 (1995) (pointing out other California code sections that require a
specified showing by the plaintiff that their claim has merit); SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OFSB 1264, at 4 (Feb. 25, 1992) (showing there are other provisions in California law that use pleading
hurdles to screen out meritless cases early in the judicial process); Goldowitz, supranote 19, at B 13 (indicating that
under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.14, which addresses health care, there must be a showing of
"substantial probability" that the plaintiff will win the claim in the complaint in order for the plaintiff to pursue
punitive damages against health care providers).
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1997).
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B. California Code of Civil Proceduresection 425.16 is Constitutional
After the long battle to adopt anti-SLAPP legislation in California, the next
hurdle was waiting to see if the newly created statute would survive constitutional
challenges. In Lafayette Morehousev. ChroniclePublishingCo., 23 the First District
Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16.24 The plaintiff,25 More University, first argued that the statute infringed on26
its right to access the courts, thereby violating its right to equal protection.
However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that if a statute that classifies litigants
is a non-suspect class, then the state only has to have a rational basis for the classification for there to be no violation of equal protection. Therefore, the court
declared the state has a rational basis for enacting the anti-SLAPP statute and that
is to "encourage continued participation in matters of public significance and that
this participation should not be chilled through the abuse of the judicial process."28
Next, the plaintiff in Lafayette Morehouse argued that because Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 allows the target of a SLAPP suit to file a special motion
30
to strike early in the lawsuit, 29 filers of SLAPP suits are denied the right to a jury.
The plaintiff claimed the right to a jury is denied because the judge is called on to
weigh evidence. 3' The purpose of the special motion to strike is to allow hearings
at the beginning of litigation to determine whether or not the suit is meritless.32 The
Court pointed out that throughout California law there are numerous code sections

23. 37 Cal. App. 4th 855.44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (1995).
24. See Lafayette Morehouse,37 Cal. App. 4th at 865-68, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52-54 (holding that California
Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is constitutional under both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution); id. at 865-66,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52 (holding that California Cede of Civil Procedure § 425.16 does
not deprive the plaintiff of equal protection); id. at 866-67, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52-53 (holding that California Codc
of Civil Procedure § 425.16 does not violate the right to a jury under the California Constitution); id. at 867-68,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53-54 (holding that California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 does not deny the plaintiff's
due process rights); see also 5 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading § 964 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that
California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 has been held constitutional on all three issues).
25. The plaintiffs in the case were More University (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc.). Dr. Victor Baranco,
founder of the University, and others. The court referred to all the plaintiff's simply as "More." Lafyette
Morerotue, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 861, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49.
26. Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 865,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1997) (stating the intent of the legislature
in implementing the special motion to strike for SLAPP suits).
29. See SENATE COMMTrEE ON JUDICIARY, CoMMMITraE ANALYSIS Op SB 1264, at 4 (Feb. 25, 1992)
(emphasizing that because of the burden of defending a meritless lawsuit there is a need for pleading protection).
30. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (providing the right to a jury in California).
31. Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 866.44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52-53; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
425.16(b) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that the court must determine "if there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim" and that in doing so the court will "consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based").
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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allowing for early determination of whether or not a case has merit.33 However, to
avoid a constitutional violation, the judge must consider the pleadings and affidavits
only so far as to determine if there is a prima facie case. Under Code of Civil

Procedure section 425.16, the trial judge is not to weigh the opposition's pleadings

and affidavits against the plaintiff's pleadings and affidavits. 4 Rather, the judge is
only to look at the opposing pleadings and affidavits to determine whether as 35a
matter of law, the plaintiffs pleadings do or do not establish a prima facie case.
Therefore, because the judge is not weighing any evidence, there is no violation of
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial.36
The last constitutional
37 challenge made in Lafayette was that the statute denied

the plaintiff due process. The plaintiff made a due process challenge because Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 states that discovery will be stayed once the

motion to strike is filed. 38 Because discovery is stayed, the plaintiff claimed a denial
of due process because without discovery, the plaintiff could not make the required
"probability" showing.39 The Court, however, pointed out that under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16(g), the lower court has discretion to allow specified
40
discovery if the plaintiff can show good cause for needing the particular discovery.
Therefore, there is no denial of due process because, if the plaintiff has good cause
for requiring discovery, the court may allow it.41
Ill. EXISTING LAW
Under existing law, a person facing a SLAPP suit can file for a special motion
to strike.42 The person defending the SLAPP must first show that the suit brought

33. See Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 866,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53 (pointing out other California
code sections that require a specified showing by the plaintiff that their claim has merit). Those code sections are
California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.13, requiring a showing of substantial probability; California Code of
Civil Procedure § 425.14, requiring a clear and convincing standard; and California Civil Code § 1714.10, requiring
a showing of reasonable probability. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 823, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454-55 (pointing out that the standard in
California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b) is similar to the standard for a motion for nonsuit or directed
verdict).
36. Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 867, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
37. Id.
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (g) (West Supp. 1997).
39. Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 867, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
40. Id. at 867,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53-54; see infra note 42 (discussing discovery under California Code of
Civil Procedure § 425.16).
41. See Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 868,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53-54 (stating that if the plaintiff
can show that he or she needs discovery in order to adequately defend the motion to strike, the judge has the
discretion to allow the discovery); id. (noting that good cause can be shown where the party moving for the motion
to strike has all the evidence needed by the non-moving party to establish a prima facie case).
42. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1997).
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against him or her falls within Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In Wilcox

v. SuperiorCourt,44 the court said that the person defending the SLAPP can show
that the statute applies by demonstrating that the act on which the suit is brought
falls within the definition of an "act in furtherance of right of petition or free
speech" under subsection (e) of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Under
existing law, the definition of acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free

speech specifically refer to only written or oral acts. 46
When enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the legislature included
in the statute their findings and intent that the statute was designed to encourage
participation in matters of public interest. 47 The legislature wanted to stop the
chilling effect that lawsuits brought against those48who speak out in a government
related forum have on the governmental process.
IV. CHANGES MADE BY CHAPTER

271

Chapter 271 expands the prior legislative intent written in the statute. Chapter
271 adds to the intent already stated in subsection (a) of section 425.16 that the
statute should be read broadly.49 The legislature made this change because of con-

flicting statements in California Courts of Appeal about how broadly the statute is
to be read.5 °

43. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452 (finding that the statute, under subsection
(b), initially places the burden on the defendant (target) to show that the suit arises from any act in furtherance of
the right to petition or free speech under both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution).
44. 27 Cal. App. 4th 809,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (1994).
45. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452 (listing what is required for the defendant
to make a prima facie showing that his or her act was in furtherance of his or her right to petition or free speech);
see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 1997) (defining an "act in furtherance of a person's right
of petition or free speech" as including written or oral statements made in connection with or under consideration
by a "legislative, executive, orjudicial body or any other official proceeding authorized by law..." or "any written
or oral statement made in a place open to the public or a public forum").
46. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "acts in furtherance." as either
written or oral acts).
47. lad§ 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1997).
48. SENATECOMM=T'EEONJUDICIARY, COMMrTfEEANALYSIS OFSB 1296, at 2 (May 13, 1997).
49. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (amended by Chapter 271 ); see ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMT'EEANALYSIS OFSB 1296, at I (July 2, 1997) (noting that Chapter 271 clarifies that the intent
of the legislature is that the statute should be read broadly).
50. Compare Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114,1126,55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 916-17 (1996) (pointing
out that the statute should be strictly limited to activities done in furtherance of a person's right to petition and that
any activity protected by the freedom of speech clause is only covered by California Code of Civil Procedure §
425.16 so far as the activity relates to the person's right to petition), with Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal.
App. 4th 1036, 1045-47, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 63-64 (1997) (criticizing the Court of Appeals interpretation of
California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 in Zhao), and Averill v. Superior Court, Eli Home Company, 42 Cal.
App. 4th 1170, 1176, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 65 (1996) (holding that the intent of the Legislature is that the statute
should be read broadly to protect acts in furtherance of both a person's right to petition and right to freedom of
speech). See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of amendments made to stated
legislative intent by a later legislature).
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In Zhao v. Wong, s the First District Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the
terms "public significance, ' 52 "public issue 5 3 and "public forum," 4 read the terms

narrowly and did not apply the statute in a situation where a newspaper reported on
a murder case. However, in Averill v. SuperiorCourt,5 5 the Fourth District Court of

and her
Appeals applied the statute to a private conversation between an employee
56
employer because the Court interpreted the word "public" very broadly.
Based on these differing interpretations the legislature amended the definition
of "an act in furtherance of a person's right to petition or right of free speech", in
Chapter 271, to include "any conduct."57 Therefore, the statute is no longer limited

to just acts that are written or oral. 8
V. COMMENT
A. Adding to the Legislative Intent

As discussed above, the need for Chapter 271 to amend the legislative intent
specified under subsection (a) of section 425.16 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure arose because of conflicting interpretations of how broadly the existing

statute should be read.5 9 A current legislature can amend the legislative intent of a
prior legislature.6 However, the more pressing question is whether the California

Court of Appeals for the First District, who interpreted the statute more narrowly,
will have to now change its reading of the statute. When a legislature makes amend-

ments to clarify existing law, the amendment "must be accepted as the legislative

51. 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d909 (1996).
52. See Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1120-21,55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913 (discussing the courts interpretation of
"public significance" and "public issue").
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1126, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 (interpreting "public forum" as narrowly as it has been interpreted in First Amendment jurisprudence).
55. 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170,50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (1996).
56. See Averill, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 1175-76,50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65 (noting the use of the word "includes"
in California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e) indicates that the three categories are not all-inclusive).
57. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (amended by Chapter 271); see Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
App. 4th 8. 18-20, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357-59 (1995) (emphasizing that the statute applies to conduct in
furtherance of the right to petition or freedom of speech); see also ASSEMBLY COMMrFEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 4 (July 2, 1997) (explaining that the need to amend § 425.16 to add "any
conduct" was brought to the attention of the legislature by the Ludwig case).
58. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional basis for adding the
language).
59. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
60. See Re-Open Rambla v. Board of Supervisors, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1499,1511, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 828
(1995) (stating that a legislature can amend a statute to "express the original legislative intent"); see also ASSEMBLY
COMirrTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSTS OF SB 1296, at 4 (July 2, 1997) (noting that Re-Open Rambla
affirms that a current legislature may express legislative intent of prior legislation).
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declaration of the meaning of the original act."'6 Moreover, under the doctrine of
legislative supremacy,' courts are required to defer to the legislature's
determination of public policy. 63 Therefore, upon review of Chapter 271, the
California Court of Appeals for the first district will have to broaden its
interpretation of California's anti-SLAPP legislation.
B. Conduct is Covered by the Constitution

Chapter 271 provides that the phrase "act in furtherance of a person's right of
petition or right of free speech under the United States or California Constitution

in connection with a public issue" will also include "any conduct" in furtherance
of a person's first amendment right of petition or freedom of speech. 64 With this

change, Chapter 271 provides that any conduct done in furtherance of a person's
right of petition or right of free speech is enough to raise a motion to strike under
section 425.16 if the conduct is "in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest." 65 Section 425.16 works by first requiring the target of a SLAPP suit
to show that the action falls within the statute and to do this it must be determined
whether the act done in furtherance, is speech protected by the First Amendment. 6
Speech does not mean merely those communications that are written or spoken but

includes nonverbal communication or conduct. 67 Some types of conduct have
received protection under the First Amendment, 63 however, much First Amendment

litigation surrounds how to determine what type of conduct is protected.

61.

See IA NORMAN L. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATrTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.31 (5th. ed. 1993) (stating

that if the amendment is enacted at the time there is controversy as to interpretations of the original statute, the
amendment is reflective of the meaning of the original statute). But see Western Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 15
Cal. 4th 232, 243, 933 P.2d 507, 514, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 250 (1997) (clarifying that the above rule of
construction is true when the amendment is enacted by a legislative body not separated by a significant amount of
time).
62. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo.LJ. 281, 283 (1989)
(stating that the doctrine is one used in statutory interpretation and it means that courts will subordinate to the
legislature when exercising the power ofjudicial review).
63. See id. at 293 (noting that courts may not blatantly ignore legislative intent). But see 2A NORMnAN L.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.03 (5th. ed. 1992) (stating that some courts do not follow
amendm-.nts interpreting a prior statute because they view the act of amending a statute's intent as the legislature
performing ajudicial function-interpreting statutes).
64. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (amended by Chapter 271).
65. Id. § 425.16 (amended by Chapter 271).
66. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
67. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communicationand the Freedom of "Speech," 1993 Wis. L. REV.
1525. 1531-32 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court recognizes expressive conduct within the meaning of speech).
68. See Cynthia L. Brennan, Comment, Mandatory Community Serice as a High School Graduation
Requirement: Inculcating Mahnes or Unconstitutional?,I1T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 253,263-64 (1994) (listing the
burning of the American flag, draft card burning, sit-ins, and picketing by labor groups as types of conduct that the
Supreme Court has found to be protected under the First Amendment).
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In Spence v. United States, 69 the Supreme Court promulgated a test for determining whether the conduct is protected by the First Amendment. 0 In making the
determination whether the conduct was equivalent to speech, the court considered
two factors: first, there must be "intent to convey a particularized message"; second,
it must be likely "that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."7'
However, the Court does not consistently apply its own test.7 2 Therefore, courts still
have no concrete criteria to determine with precision what conduct falls within the
meaning of "speech" under the First Amendment. 3 As a result of the amendment
made by Chapter 271, there may be increased collateral litigation as to whether the
conduct of the target of the SLAPP suit is conduct protected by the free speech and
right to petition clauses of the Unites States and California Constitutions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The amendments to Chapter 271 may help courts to apply the special motion
to strike for SLAPP suits more consistently. Chapter 271 now instructs the courts
that the statute is to be given a broad interpretation. Hopefully, with this broader
intent, more frivolous suits will meet an early end, thereby freeing up limited
judicial resources for more meritorious claims.
Now any conduct in furtherance of free speech or the right to petition will give
rise to the statute's application. Chapter 271 goes further to make sure that those
who do "speak out" will be better protected. The government of the United States
is a democracy calling for participation in government by the people. Protecting
those who wish to utilize their rights to address their government is the ultimate
goal of Chapter 271. The new amendments deliver the knockout punch to filers of
SLAPP suits.

69. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
70. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11 (stating that if the conduct was "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication" the conduct should be afforded First Amendment protection).
71. Id.
72. See Tiersma, supra note 67, at 1538-39 (noting that the two factors for determining whether conduct
is equivalent to speech are difficult to apply and further noting that the Supreme Court had only applied the test in
two cases).
73. See id. at 1539 (noting that when the Spence test is not used to determine what conduct is protected, then
defining precisely what conduct is protected with the meaning of speech remains elusive).

